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STATE OF UTAH,
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Plaintiff/Appellee,
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CASE NO- 900148

DONALD WAYNE BROWN,

*

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant•

*

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
A number of issues raised by the Defendant on appeal were not
raised in the trial court below. With regard to those issues, the
State has argued in its "Introduction To Argument" that this Court
abandon its openness to reviewing issues based on a Constitutional
question where the Defendant's liberty is at stake.

State v.

Jamison, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah, 1990); State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d
440 (Utah, 1983).
The State first argues that the second prong of the test is
meaningless because in a criminal case, the Defendant's liberty is
always at stake. While some day that may be true, this Court can
take judicial notice that at present, Utah law provides for
probation, and

further, that when

incarceration

is

imposed,

frequently such sentence will have been served by the time an
appeal is decided.

This prong of the test, therefore, eliminates

the majority of criminal cases where no incarceration is imposed
or the length of incarceration is unsubstantial.

See also B.,

N.H., In re, 777 P.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1989) a juvenile case holding
no liberty interest involved.
The State then argues that the Court of Appeals has recently

had difficulty applying this test in State v. Harrison, 152 Utah
Adv. Rep- 19, 24 n. 13 (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1991) and State v.
Hargraves, No. 890684-CA, slip op. at 5-6 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 7,
1991).

A careful reading of the Harrison decision reveals that

while the opinion claimed that "We do not find a liberty interest
at stake because of the remoteness of the gender-bias issue to
Harrison's main claim of improper racial motivation, " (Ftnt. 13,
p. 30), it was in effect applying the harmless error rule, or
concluding there was no merit to the claim, noting on the gender
make-up of the jury, that even with the exclusion of two hispanic
women on peremptory challenges by the State, that the Defendant
still ended up with five women on his jury."

The standard is not

difficult to apply and should not be abandoned because of the
Harrison case not analyzing and deciding the gender make-up issue.
Finally, the State cites the inconsistent application of the
rule in Harrison as opening a flood of federal habeas reviews of
Utah cases under the ruling of Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377,
1382-83 (10th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990).
A careful reading of the Coleman analysis reveals that Coleman
had in fact been treated quite unfairly by the Oklahoma appeals
courts.

The opinion cited a number of cases in which Defendants

were, on appeal, given the benefit of case law enunciated between
trial and appeal where trial counsel could not have preserved error
based on the as yet unenunciated case law, but where Coleman was
not permitted such review under the appellate court's "sufficient
reason" test.
2

A "sufficient reason" rule is obviously more difficult to
impose with consistency than the "Constitutional issue/liberty of
Defendant" rule.

In addition, the unfair application of the

"sufficient reason" rule was manifest with regard to Coleman and
there is little evidence to suggest that Oklahoma's misapplication
of its "sufficient reason" rule in Coleman opened the flood gates
of Oklahoma federal habeas reviews.
The "Constitutional issue/liberty of Defendant" rule is a
useful tool for appellate review of substantial Constitutional
issues which should have been raised at the trial level in cases
where the Defendant's liberty is at stake.
Counsel for the State has in its brief scrambled the order of
the issues as presented in Appellant's brief.

For purposes of

clarity, the Appellant will stick to the original order of the
issues with reference made to the designation given that issue by
the State, if different.

ISSUE I.
Expanded Statement of Facts
Defendant believes the State has overstated the facts in
support of its argument that the warrantless search and seizure of
Defendant's property be upheld under the exceptions of consent or
plain view.

Hence a more in depth review of the pertinent

testimony from the suppression hearing held January 24, 1990 is
provided.
The State stipulated that Defendant Brown and two co-workers
3

and co-defendants, Cummins, and Cayer, were on the date of the
search and seizure living in the trailer searched, and that much
of their personal property was in that trailer. (Trans, p. 40, 11.
3-6).

According to State's witness, Anderson, perishable food

items for all of the camp were kept in the refrigerator in that
trailer while non-perishable items were kept in all the trailers
(p. 65-66, 11. 21-6).

The common practice was to knock before

entering (p. 66, 1. 13-16).

There was a privacy interest (p. 66,

11. 17, 18). Sometimes they had direct access to the food in the
refrigerator but sometimes it would be handed out to them (p. 62,
11. 17-25, p. 66, 11. 19-24).
The ground radios were kept in trailer number three (p. 64,
1. 5 ) , and all had access to the trailer to use the ground radio
(p. 64, 11. 11-13).

The radios were kept straight in front of the

door in a little night stand (p. 65, 11. 4-6).

The workers had

"common respect not to go into somebody else's trailer unless they
were there." (p. 70, 11. 9, 10). The only exception was if they
needed food (p. 70, 1. 16). As for the radios, "during the day the
radios were mostly on the boats or with the people that were in the
trucks hauling whatever." (p. 70, 11. 17-19).
According to Deputy Roger Olsen, the search of the trailers
began after the van with the prisoners left at 11:15 AM although
the prisoners had been handcuffed and placed in a trailer at 8:35
AM (p. 23, 11. 7-24).

Officer Ward was the controlling officer at

the scene (p. 24, 11. 5, 6). According to Officer Ward, he and
Officer Yeates searched trailer #3 around 1:00 PM (p. 43, 11. 54

9), p. 34, 11. 3-10).

This was after Officer Yeates told him that

someone had given permission to enter and search the trailer (p.
33, 11. 14 - p. 34, 1. 2).
Of the three officers that testified, all three had entered
the trailer earlier for some particular reason prior to the major
search that occurred at about 1:00 PM. Officer Olsen went in three
times.

The first time was shortly after arriving at the camp to

check for other individuals posing a threat or any weapons that
could be used (p. 16, 11. 19, 20). He went back two other times
to look for cigarettes for co-defendants, Brown and Cayer, and was
told first to look on the bunk and then in the third drawer under
the sink (p. 17, 1. 20 - p. 18, 1. 8). On the initial search,
"nobody found no weapons readily observed." (p. 17, 11. 4, 5). On
the second time in, he doesn't recall seeing any of the evidence
that was ultimately seized from that trailer (p. 18, 11. 10-13).
Officer Ward, in charge of the crime scene, went inside the
trailer twice with Deputy Olsen to retrieve the cigarettes prior
to the afternoon search (p. 29, 11. 10-12, p. 31, 11. 3-7). On the
first trip in, the only evidence that he observed in plain view was
a pasteboard box with blood on the outside and magazines inside,
a pair of white tennis shoes with blood on them, and a crescent
wrench (p. 29, 1. 15 - p. 30, 1. 11).

He observed nothing in

addition to those three items on his second trip inside (p. 31, 11.
8-11) . Officer Ward and Officer Yeates later went back in together
for the thorough search (p. 34, 11. 3, 4 ) .

A pink bag, later

identified as Defendants and containing his clothes, was at that
5

time located "in the table area sitting on one of the benches." (p.
36, 11. 17-21).

Defendant's white folding knife was found on the

top bunk at the rear of the trailer (p. 36, 1. 22 - p. 37, 1. 3).
Officer Yeates went into the trailer prior to the later
thorough search to get some medication for co-defendant, Cayer (p.
74, 19-24).

On that trip, he recalled seeing tennis shoes with a

red stain, a cardboard box with a red stain, waders or hip boots
with stains, and "sitting on the sink in plain view was a wrench
that was wet." (p. 75, 1. 16 - p. 76, 1. 14). He recalled seeing
nothing else on this occasion (p. 76, 11. 20-22).

Officer Yeates

went in a second time to get a radio (p. 82, 11. 23-25).
is stated regarding observation of any more evidence.

Nothing

He "simply

stepped in, grabbed the radio, and stepped out." (p. 89, 11. 11,
12) . He went in a third time after radio conversation with one of
the owner's, Pat Benchley (p. 82, 11. 23-25).

At first this

officer testified that he had collected the evidence including the
pink bag and saw the butt end of a knife on the top bunk at the
rear end of the trailer prior to talking to Benchley (p. 77, 11.
1-10, p. 81, 11. 3-25).
testimony.

Later on in the hearing, he corrected his

He then made it clear that the search and seizure and

observation of the pink bag occurred after talking with Benchley
(p. 82, 11. 20-25) when he entered with Officer Ward and one other
officer (p. 91, 11. 1-4).

Officer Yeates didn't see any items

other than the tennis shoes, hip waders, cardboard box, and wrench
on his preliminary entries (p. 90, 11. 2-13).
Officer Shephard testified that Officer Ward sent him out the
6

next day to retrieve the white folding knife on the top bunk (p.
97, 11. 2-24).
Argument
The State concedes that the trial court's reliance on the
search incident to arrest and exigent circumstances exceptions to
the warrant requirement are questionable but still argues for the
plain view

and

consent

basis of the

search

and

seizure of

Defendant's bag of clothing and his folding knife. The State first
argues that the consent exception is appropriate because the owner
of the trailer and the business had authority over the "common
areas" of trailer #3 that were associated with the employment
activities of the business. The argument that entry by an employee
other than a resident of trailer #3 for purposes of securing food
or a radio makes

that

trailer

a

"common area"

ignores the

legitimate expectation of privacy that was demonstrated by the
workers in the camp.

In addition to knocking, the food required

was often handed to them.

The radios were out in the boats and

trucks during the day and when inside the trailer, were just inside
the door.

"The core inquiry is whether a person has a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the area searched."

United States v.

Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296, citing Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 497, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 1256, 2 L.Ed 2d 1514. In Bilanzich,
authority by the owner to consent was found with regard only to
the business office in which he had the defendant conduct the hotel
business.

This employee had three other rooms to use as her

personal residence.
7

Neither of the other cases cited by the State are particularly
helpful

either

in resolving

expectation of privacy.

the core

issue of a reasonable

Donovan v. A. A. Biero Construction Co.,

746 F.2d 894, 898-90O (D.C. Circ. 1984) "involved open construction
areas devoid of any reasonable expectations of privacy."

That

opinion further notes that the citations involving a changing shed
and a tool trailer had been vacated.

State v. Kendrick, 736 P.2d

1079 (1987) involved a roofing business's shop which the defendant
claimed to be using as his

"crash pad".

The shop was used

primarily to hold roofing materials and personal items of the
owner. The consents to search given by the owners in both of these
cases pertained to property not only having a primary business
purpose, but also where the actual use was not restricted primarily
to an employee for his residence.
Defendant Brown and the other two co-tenants in the trailer
had a strong and reasonable expectation of privacy in their trailer
despite the incidental use of their refrigerator for perishable
food and the night stand inside the door for the radios.
The State next argues that even if the trailer's owner could
not give valid consent, the search would still be valid if the
officer acted in a good faith belief that the person giving consent
had the authority to do so. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793
(1990), extended the "good faith" exception to otherwise invalid
warrantless consent searches under the Federal Constitution.
This Court should not follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme
Court in this regard.

To do so could virtually wipe out privacy
8

interests in their residence of any sort of tenant. What landlord
does not have an occasional business purpose for entry into a
residence and what police officer would not seek the consent of the
landlord rather than that of the tenant whose residence he seeks
to search.
The State correctly criticizes appellant

for not having

provided an analysis of the question under Article I, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution which the Defendant urged as a separate
basis for suppressing the seized evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has in recent years recognized the need
to provide protection for its citizens under the Utah Constitution
as the federal Court has scaled back the protections afforded under
the federal Constitution.

In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah

1987), even though the "good faith" exception provided by Utah Code
77-35-12(g) was found to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, footnote 4 of the opinion notes
reservation for the future of the level of conduct required by the
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14.

Justice Zimmerman

(concurring) notes that even if the court's reading of United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed. 2d 677
(1984) were in error (good faith exception limited to searches
pursuant to a warrant), Utah Code 77-35-12(g) wouldn't necessarily
be saved, in that the protections under Article 1, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution have never been carefully considered.

See

State v. Hvcrh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-74 (Utah, 1985).
The Utah Court fleshed out a part of Article 1, Section 14 of
9

the Utah Constitution in State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460 (Utah,
1990) where it was expressly held that the exclusionary rule was
a

necessary

consequence

of

police

violations

of

the

Utah

Constitution, The opinion noted that at least 18 other states have
adopted an independent state constitutional exclusionary rule.
Even though dealing with an automobile search, the following
language from Larocco resonates even more in the context of search
of a residence.
Specifically this Court will continue to use the
concept of expectation of privacy as a suitable threshold
criterion for determining whether Article I, section 14
is applicable. Then if Article I, section 14 applies,
warrantless searches will be permitted only where they
satisfy their traditional justification, namely to
protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent
the destruction of evidence (p. 469).
In focusing on the expectation of privacy and requiring the State
to show a traditional justification for a warrantless search in
this case, it is evident that none have been proposed.

The State

has not carried its burden of proof for a warrantless search.
State v. Christiansen. SIS P.2d 408 (Utah, 1984).
Other states have declined to apply the "good faith" exception
of Leon to their state constitutions.

People v. Biqelow, 488

N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985) sets out three primary public policy reasons
for not adapting the good faith exception.
rule's purpose is frustrated.
[or lazy] police action.

(1) The exclusionary

(2) A premium is placed on illegal

(3) A positive incentive is provided to

others to engage in similar lawless acts in the future.

That

opinion reminds us that constitutional protections are not only for
the protection of the defendant, but for the protection of all
10

citizens.

In accord are New Jersey (State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d

820 (1987)), Michigan (People v. Sundlina, 395 N.W.2d 308 (1986)),
Massachusetts

(Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548

(1985)),

Wisconsin (State v. Grawien, 367 N.E.2d 816 (1985), but noting
other states that have adopted Leon), and North Carolina (State v.
Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988)).

The North Carolina court, in

Carter, "justifies its exclusionary rule not only on deterrence but
upon the preservation of the integrity of the judicial branch of
government..." (at 516), as protector of the rights of all of its
citizens under the state constitution.
The good faith exception of Illinois v. Rodriguez should not
be adopted by this Court and applied to the Utah Constitution.
Finally, the State argues that the search and the seizure of
the bag of clothes and the knife come under the plain view
exception. The State attempts to shift the burden to the Defendant
by alleging that the Defendant does not claim that the clothes bag
and the knife were not in plain view or that probable cause to
believe they were evidence of a crime did not exist. The State has
the burden of proof and review of the facts show that neither the
bag of clothes nor the knife were observed by any of the police
officers until after their re-entry into the trailer for the
specific purpose of searching it and seizing property.

If the

search is upheld as valid based on consent, then the plain view
argument is irrelevant.

If the search is not upheld on consent,

there was no plain view and the argument must fail.

11

ISSUE II.
The State argues in its Point IX that despite defense counsel
not being prepared to step in and proceed as instructed by the
court, that Defendant has failed to show how the cross-examinations
were

deficient

or that

the result would

probably

have been

different.
While the material that defense counsel had to master included
949 pages of preliminary hearing testimony, an example of Mr.
Willmore's frustrations is an in-chambers conference with the Judge
after attempting to lead Denton Beecher, the County Surveyor,
through testimony regarding some charts he had drawn and the lines
of vision that Richard Anderson would have been limited to in
making his observations.

Willmore states:

I want to make a motion for a mistrial on the basis that
the - for example, while we were questioning Mr. Beecher,
I had him mark a foot and a half back into the trailer,
and you honor did make several comments about the
witnesses testified that they were moving all around.
This, that, and the other, I was not characterizing.
That that's absolutely where or anything. And I think
it's improper for the court to refer to that and go over
it several times to the jury as to what the testimony has
been.
I had not mischaracterized it, anything
whatsoever, and I make a motion for a mistrial on that
basis [T. 757:4-13].
Mr. Willmore's difficulties in examining the witnesses and the
very different understanding of their testimony from what the judge
was hearing is evident.
In addition, Willmore failed to call Ray Cabututan as a
witness regarding the fact that he alone handled the crescent
wrench.

The State objects that the partial transcript of his

testimony in his own trial, which preceded Brown's, on January 2212

26, 1990, which was included in Defendant's Addendum, wasn't
certified.

A complete copy of the transcript from Cabututan's

trial would have been too voluminous to have included. This Court
can take judicial notice of its own records in State v. Raymond
Cabututan, Supreme Court #900289.

That record is either in the

possession of the Clerk or else with Assistant Attorney General
Judy Atherton, who last checked out the file.
Cabututan's testimony against his own penal interest, that he
was the only one who had the wrench would have cast substantial
doubt on the accuracy of Richard Anderson's observations and
testimony.
The performance of counsel was deficient in some demonstrable
manner and the outcome of the trial would probably have been
different but for the error.

State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645.

ISSUE III.
The State argues, in its Point VIII, that the Defendant did
not preserve the issue of his appointed counsel's conflict of
interest for appeal.

Defendant requests that this Court address

this issue under the plain error or exceptional circumstances
rules.
Although the Defendant, in filing his Motion For Dismissal of
Attorney [Ct. Record 242-245, Exhibit A of Addendum to Appellant's
Brief], was primarily concerned about his appointed attorney's lack
of diligence in investigation and preparation for trial, he also
stated he was unhappy about counsel's divulging "things about my
13

case" to the court and the other defendants' attorneys.
court was well

aware of Defendant's

concerns

Thus the

regarding this

particular attorney's commitment to his representation.

While it

seems likely that the District Judge sitting in Box Elder County
must have known that counsel was the city prosecutor for two of the
municipalities in his county, his attention was surely drawn to
that fact during the questioning of Mr. Munns as a prospective
juror when defense counsel, assisting in voir dire, inquired as to
ill feelings from having prosecuted a member of the juror's family
the prior year (T. 84-86).

The trial court's error in appointing

counsel should have been obvious at that point.
The Defendant also asserts that the error was harmful.

In

addition to the reasons stated in Defendant's Motion For Dismissal
of Attorney, counsel did not request a continuance

although

relatively unprepared when Defendant foundered in his attempt at
pro se representation and the Judge called Defendant and counsel
into chambers, didn't properly object to prior bad acts evidence,
failed to call co-defendant Ray Cabututan regarding his sole use
of the wrench, didn't vigorously object to the jury's continued
deliberation for 13+ hours after a full day of trial, and didn't
object to an Allen instruction. The error affected the substantial
rights of the Defendant and was harmful.
The Defendant further asserts that this error constituted a
violation of his constitutional rights to effective assistance of
counsel, and due process under Article I, Sections 12 and 7 of the
Utah Constitution.

The court should review such issues when, as
14

in this case, the liberty of the defendant is at stake.

State v.

Jamison, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah, 1990).
This Court could, however, resolve this matter without need
to address the constitutional issues. It could follow the example
of People v. Rhodes, 524 P.2d 363 (Cal. 1974), by the exercise of
its plenary power. That court, in holding "that city attorneys who
have prosecutorial responsibilities may not represent criminal
defendants" (at 367) also states, "Our judicially declared rule
renders

a

determination

of

these

constitutional

issues

unnecessary." (Ftnt. 13, p. 368).
Among the reasons stated in the Rhodes decision for the rule
are the conflicting interests a city prosecutor would likely be
subjected to including maintaining good relations with the police
departments, noting that:
Neighboring and overlapping law enforcement agencies have
close working relationships, and resentment engendered
by a city attorney within the membership of such agencies
would have an adverse effect on the relationship of the
city attorney with members of his own local police
department. (p.3 6 6).
Other compelling public policy considerations are a weakening
of assistance to law enforcement agencies during or because of a
vigorous representation of a criminal defendant by a public
prosecutor, the need for the public to have absolute confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice,
and the avoidance of the appearance of impropriety.

Rhodes cites

opinion 34 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association as well as Karlin v. State, 177 N.W.2d (Wise. 1970)
and Goodson v. Pevton, 351 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1961) in support
15

of this position.
While reversing the conviction, the Rhodes opinion goes out
of its way to not criticize the quality of legal counsel or the
judge for making the appointment.

(Ftnt. 4, p. 365).

It found

this type of conflict so compelling that it did not require a
separate showing of prejudice.
Finally, the State, in its brief, argues that the record does
not establish that defense counsel was a part-time city attorney
and prosecutor at the time he was appointed to represent the
Defendant.
This Court is asked to take judicial notice, as did the court
in Rhodes, ftnt. 1, p. 364, when faced with a similar argument by
the state, of defense counsel's employment as a city attorney. The
identity of a public official is a proper subject for judicial
notice.

While requests for affidavits were made to both the City

of Garland and the City of Tremonton regarding Mr. Willmore's
employment

as

their

city

attorney

during

the

time

he

was

representing the Defendant, only the City of Tremonton complied
with the request.

An original Affidavit of Paul Buys, City

Recorder for the City of Tremonton, is attached together with a
Professional Services Agreement (Exhibit A of Addendum) which shows
that Thomas Willmore was employed as the city prosecutor at the
time of trial, February 12-15 and 20, 1990.

The Defendant moves

this Court to take judicial notice of that fact.
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ISSUE IV.
The

State

argues,

in

its

Point

III,

that

while

the

prosecutor's reference to Defendant as a "mad dog" was probably
improper, that it was not reversible error.
In light of the defense of Defendant that his involvement was
to look for a knife on the victim, that he eventually intervened
and separated the combatants, and the fact that he called the owner
the next morning when he discovered that Miguel was dead, the "mad
dog" was highly inflammatory and should be regarded as reversible
error.

ISSUE V.
The State argues, in its Point II, that the Defendant, while
objecting

to

testimony

of

unrelated

prior

bad

acts

of

the

Defendant, did not specifically object under Rules 404 and 405,
Utah Rules of Evidence, but instead objected that the questioning
by the prosecutor on re-direct examination was beyond the scope of
recross.
While defense counsel was correct in his objection and the
testimony should not have been permitted on that basis, its
admission was also plain error in violation of Rules 404 and 405.
The Defendant, in undertaking his own defense and cross-examining
one of the State's witnesses, nearly opened up a can of worms
regarding his own character before he was interrupted by his courtappointed attorney and abandoned that line of questioning [T. 378:
1-2]. Then on redirect examination, the State's attorney attempted
17

to introduce evidence of a threat by Defendant against another coworker other than the deceased.

Defense counsel began making his

objection but was rudely interrupted by the State's attorney before
he could complete h^s objection. The context of the objection made
it clear that the objection was directed at any evidence of any
belligerence to any third person [T. 432-433 attached as Exhibit
B in Addendum].
Whether plain error is viewed under the two-prong test of
State v. Eldridqe, 773 P. 2d 29

(Utah, 1989) or the standard

presented in Justice Stewart's dissent in that same case, it is
present.

The first inquiry is whether it should have been obvious

to a trial court that it was committing error.

While defense

counsel was cut off and never did complete his statement of his
objection, the State's attorney had already made it clear that he
was

asking

about

an

"altercation"

[T. 432:19]

involving

Ed

Robinson, or Black Eddie [T. 432:15] who obviously was not the
victim, Miguel Ramirez, nor State's witness, Eddie Apadoca. Hence,
the error should have been obvious.
The second prong is also satisfied, namely that it affect the
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful.
Not only did the State succeed in eliciting the fact that the
Defendant had had a prior altercation with another co-worker at the
camp but that the Defendant had also made a statement afterward
that he'd like to see him dead.

Thi^ evidence was extremely

harmful in light of Defendant's defense that he had not assaulted
the victim but merely intervened by trying to look for and remove
18

a knife from the victim's possession during the fight [T. 800:1624], later broke up the fight by pulling Williams off the victim
and pushing Cayer back [T. 803:15-21], and then upon discovering
the victim dead the next morning called by radio to report it [T.
809:21-810:4], confirmed by the owner that Defendant Brown had
called him at about 7:00 AM that morning to report the death [T.
524:8-21].
The error

satisfies the prior

standard

for plain error

enunciated by Justice Steward in Eldridge (dissenting):

"that the

error must be palpable and made to appear on the face of the record
and to the manifest prejudice of the accused." (at 42) and comes
well within the majority statement of the rule as elucidated in
footnote 8.
...[I]n appropriate cases we can exercise our discretion
to dispense with the requirement of obviousness so that
justice can be done, as when an error not readily
apparent to the Court or counsel proves harmful in
retrospect•
. • .At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit
us to avoid injustice. No statement of the factors that
are important to our deliberations on the point should
be read to limit our power to achieve that end.
Eldridge at 35.

ISSUE VI.
The cases cited by the State, in its Point V, even at the most
extreme, involves 12 hours of straight jury deliberation.
v. State, 603 P.2d 700 (Nev. 1979).

Farmer

In the instant case, 13 1/2

hours, following immediately upon a full day of trial exceeds the
bounds of reasonableness. The sole inquiry made by the court after
19

ten hours of deliberation was whether the jury had a verdict. The
report by the bailiff an hour later that they "were moving along"
tends to support Defendant's contention that the court did not make
sufficient inquiry when defense counsel moved to recess the jury
so that they could rest.

Defendant requests this Court to take

judicial notice of the difficulty human beings have in performing
quality work after Deing deprived of sleep and working straight for
22 hours, trial plus deliberation.
This error is compounded by the Allen instruction, Allen v.
United

States,

164

U.S.

492

(1896),

and

should

constitute

reversible error, whether under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution or Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Utah
Constitution, or under the plenary powers of this Court.

ISSUE VII.
The State, in its Point IV, does not argue that the Allen
instruction given was proper, but only that the Defendant failed
to object at trial, hence waiving the error.

The Court should

address this issue, in that it involves a Constitutional issue and
the Defendant's liberty is at stake.

State v. Jamison, 800 P.2d

798 (Utah, 1990).
Even under the application of the plain error rule, this
error, amplified by the lengthy deliberations of the jury and the
other errors presented in this appeal, constituted such prejudice
to the Defendant that the first prong of the plain error rule
should be relaxed.

State v. Eldridae, 773 P.2d 29, 35, ftnt 8,
20

(Utah, 1989).

ISSUE VIII.
The State, in its Point VI, claims, quoting State v. Verdin,
595 P. 2d 862 (Utah, 1979) that the distinctions in levels of
proscribed conduct between Aggravated Assault (76-5-103(1)(b) and
Threatening With a Dangerous Weapon (76-10-506) are clear and
easily comprehended.

That may have been true in the Verdin case

where a firearm was involved.
However, the only distinction that Defendant can decipher
between Utah Code 76-10-506 aid Aggravated Assault when the assault
is charged under the subsection (b) alternative of the assault
statute, is the show of immediate force or violence, which, in the
context of this case in the light most favorable to the State
involved a crescent wrench rather than a firearm, is a requirement
of close proximity of the parties.

No such evidence was produced

at trial and at most therefore the Defendant could have been guilty
of Utah Code 76-10-506.

ISSUE IX.
On this issue, State's Point VII, there is agreement regarding
the error in ordering an indigent defendant to pay all costs
including attorney's fees.

However, this portion of the sentence

could simply be vacated givan the Defendant's indigent status
rather than requiring a hearing.
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CONCLUSION
This case should be remanded for new trial.

((
IL

Respectfully submitted this

day of April, 1991

/ttutL^
71JJNathan Hult
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby give notice that I hand delivered four copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to counsel
for the
Plaintiff/Appellee, R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on the /XL
day of April, 1991.

7UC 7^4/A

Nathan Hult
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit A

Affidavit of Paul Buys, Recorder for City of
Tremonton, and Professional Services Agreement

Exhibit B

Partial Transcript - Objection To Evidence Of Prior
Bad Acts of Defendant

EXHIBIT A
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL BOYS
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER:
ss
STATE OF UTAH

:

I, Paul Buys, upon oath, state as follows:
1.

I am the City Recorder for the City of Tremonton, Utah.

2.

As such, I am familiar with and keep the records for the

City of Tremonton.
3. The City of Tremonton has contracted with Bruce Jorgensen
and Thomas Willmore to provide legal services to the City of
Tremonton and a copy of that contract is attached.
4.

Thomas

Willmore

has

been

handling

the misdemeanor

prosecutions for the City of Tremonton among other legal services
pursuant to this contract from the date of the contract up until
the present.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

Paul Buys
Affiant
Paul Buys, being first duly sworn does depose and say that he
is the Affiant in the foregoing action, that he has read the
foregoing document, and knows the contents thereof, and that the
same is true of his own knowledge, except as to those matters
therein stated on information and belief, and as to those matters,
believes them to be true.

Paul Buys
Subscribed and sworn t o before me t h i s
1991.
.
Residing a t : £f
<%y^ 6o
Commission e x p i r e s : ^/>^/^/

/3

day of 7 7yi j^rJk

Notary r f i ^ ^ I V ,
1

lAluAturi^.

/9?/,

c

c

2
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT

^4

THIS AGREEMENT made as of January 1, 1989, between
Tremonton City, a Utah municipal corporation, 102 South
Tremont Street, P.O. Box 98, Tremonton, Utah, 84337 (herein
referred to as "City"), and OLSON & HOGGAN, Attorneys at Law,
a Utah general partnership, 123 East Main, P.O. Box 115,
Tremonton, Utah, 84337 (herein referred to as "Attorney").
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the City has previously employed Attorney as
its general counsel on an interim basis beginning October 1,
1988 and continuing through December 31, 1988; and
WHEREAS, the employment relationship between the parties
has worked to their mutual benefit and both parties desire to
continue the same and to formalize their agreement in
writing;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants
and agreements herein undertaken it is agreed between the
parties as follows:
1. The City employs Attorney as its City Attorney or
General Counsel, said Attorney to represent the City in all
matters requested of it by the City, and Attorney agrees that
it shall do and perform any and all legal duties entrusted to
it by the City, subject to any restrictions imposed by reason
of conflicts-of-interest, provision of law or other similar
source.
2. The term of this Agreement shall commence on the
date noted above and shall continue in effect until
terminated by either party, which termination shall be
effected by written notice from one party to the other at
least thirty (30) days prior to the termination date stated
therein.
3. a. Attorney agrees and obligates itself to faithfully represent the interests of the City as its Attorney and
the City agrees to and shall pay the Attorney for all
services rendered hereunder at the hourly rate of $70.00 per
hour, except for representation in connection with criminal
matters, which shall be interpreted to involve representation
of the City in prosecutions for the violation of City Traffic
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and Criminal codes or ordinances and those actions directly
related to such criminal matters. For representation in
connection with criminal matters, the City agrees to pay
Attorney a monthly retainer, payable at the first of each
month, of $500,00. Attorney agrees to maintain daily records
of the time committed to criminal matters and to reasonably
advise the City's Manager and/or Police Chief if the time so
committed for a particular month will exceed a total of ten
(10) hours. The Attorney's fees for services on criminal
matters in any month which are in excess of the ten (10)
hours, shall be billed to and paid by the City on a monthly
basis at the hourly rate noted above. Any costs advanced by
Attorney for the City shall be billed on a monthly basis and
paid by the client with each monthly remittance.
b. The compensation agreement contained in this paragraph shall remain in effect for services rendered through
June 30, 1990, with any reconsideration or negotiation
regarding the same to be considered and agreed to by the
parties in March, 1990, and March of each year thereafter, in
order that arrangements can be completed and the information
available for the City to utilize as it prepares the budget
for the next fiscal year commencing on July 1 of each year.
4. Attorney shall not employ associate counsel,
investigators or other professional assistance without the
express, written consent of the City. In addition, the
present staff assignments by Attorney of Bruce L. Jorgensen
and Thomas L. Willraore, who work as the attorneys assigned to
represent the City in civil and criminal matters respectively, shall not be changed without prior approval by the
City.
5. Any notices required by the terms of this Agreement
shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly
served if delivered in person to the party for whom it was
intended, or if delivered at or sent by registered or certified mail to the business address for whom it is intended,
said addresses as set forth above. The addresses of the
parties may be changed by written notice to the other.
6. This Agreement is for the personal services of
Attorney and may not be assigned by either party.

-3IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their
hands on the day and year first above written.
TREMONTON CITY, a Utah
Municipal Corporation
ATTEST:
/

City Recorder
(CITY)
OLSON & HOGGAN, a Utah
Partnership

(ATTORNEY)
BLJ/4

EXHIBIT 6

432

IN RELATION TO WHETHER OR NOT YOU'D SEEN HIM BECOME
BELLIGERENT.

DO YOU RECALL TESTIFYING AT THE PRELIMINARY

HEARING ABOUT —

HAVE ''OU EVER SEEN AT ANY TIME OUT THERE WHEN

YOU WERE WORKING WITH DON BFOWN THAT HE EVER BECAME
BELLIGERENT OR HAD ANY PROBLEMS WITH ANYBODY?

I'M TALKING

ABOUT DON BROWN, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THEY OR THEM.

DO YOU

RECALL YOUR RESPONSE TO THAT?
A

NO, NOT RIGHT —

NO.

Q

DO YOU RECALL THIS ANSWER, HE HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONE OF

| THE WORKERS, YES.
A

YEAH, I CAN REMEMBER THAT MOW, YES.

Q

THEN THE QUESTION WAS, WHO.

A

YES.

Q

DO YOU RECALL YOUR RESPONSE?

A

YES.

Q

OKAY.

A

YES, DIFFERENT EDDIE THAN

Q

AND DO YOU RECALL WHAT BROWN TOLD YOU REGARDING THAT

ED ROBINSO'vJ, OR ED —

BLACK EDDIE.

A DIFFERENT EDDII THAN THE EDDIE APODACA?
—

ALTERCATION?
A

YES, I —

HE SAID

MR. WILLMORE:

YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT THERE.

IT'S BEYOND WHAT THE SCOPE OF CROSS WAS AND

—

MR. BUNDERSONi

ABSOLUTELY IS NOT.

THE COURT:

I THINK THAT MR. BROWN ASKED THE QUESTION

IF HE'D EVER BEEN BELLIGERENT BEFORE THAT TIME, AND SPENT A
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QREfiT DIAL UF TIM! TQuKINS filOUT HIS ATTITUDE,
MR. WILLMORE:

I THINK IT WAS BELLIGERENT TO MR.

ANDERSON.
THE COURT:

THAT WASN'T THE QUESTION.

MR. BUNDERSON:

HE WENT FURTHER THAN THAT, HE READ

THE COURT:

THAT WASN'T THE QUESTION.

MR. BUNDERSON:

THANK YOU.

Q

GO AHEAD.

A

HE WAS —

HIS —

—

I'LL ALLOW IT.

HIS STATEMENT WAS, I'D LIKE TO SEE MR. —

OR ED TAKE A DIP IN THE LAKE AND NOT COME BACK UP.
Q

OKAY.

A

NO.

AND DO YOU RECALL APPROXIMATELY WHEN THAT WAS?
EARLIER IN THE WEE!*, OR SOMETHING. YOU KNOW, MONDAY

OR TUESDAY OR SOMEWHERE AROUND THERE.
Q

OKAY.

YOU WERE ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR

CONDITION WHEN —

YOUR PHYSICAL CONDITION WHEN YOU HAD GIVEN

THE TWO EARLIER STATEMENTS, THAT IS, YOUR WRITTEN STATEMENT
AND YOUR VERBAL STATEMENT.
A

YES.

Q

OKAY.

A

VERBAL —

WHAT DAYS DID YOU GIVE THOSE STATEMENTS?
WRITTEN STATEMENT WAS ON THE DAY AFTER, AND THE

VERBAL STATEMENT WAS THE SAME DAY.
Q

OKAY.

SO WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE £6TH, THE EVENT

OCCURRED ON THE NIGHT OF THE £STH
A

YEAH, IT WAS THE £STH.

Q

OKAY.

—

AND YOUR EXPLANATION OF WHAT YOU MEANT BY COHERENT

